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Abstract 
Many historians of China, particularly those based in North America, insist that the Qing 
dynasty’s territorial expansion was imperial, and comparable to the imperial expansion of other 
global empires.  Other historians, particularly but not only those based in the PRC, continue to 
resist this interpretation. They argue that dynastic expansion in the Ming and Qing periods was 
simply a form of nation-state building, akin to similar processes in Europe.  Rather than rejecting 
their claims as a product of Chinese nationalism, we argue that the term “empire” should be 
(re-)understood as a global co-production, emerging from multiple intersecting histories and 
scholarly debates about those histories. Doing so challenges influential definitions of empire 
which rely on a distinction between empires and nation-states, highlighting their dual presence in 
both Euro-American and Chinese pasts (and presents). This move demands a rejection of 
periodizations which suggest that empires ceased to exist following the period of decolonization 
from 1945-1970s.  This opens up new avenues of historical and normative enquiry to 
acknowledge the modern continuity between empires and nation-states.  
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Introduction 
Historians have long grappled with the questions of what an empire is, what constitutes 
imperialism, and whether these terms can be meaningfully divided into temporal categories such 
as “modern” and “pre-modern” (Morrison 2012a, 1-17; Stoler 2006, 127) . For the imperial 
historian Frederick Cooper, empires—which he defines as political units which are “large, 
expansionist” and “reproduce the differentiation and inequality among people [they] incorporate” 
—have been consigned to history: they disappeared when Britain and France gave up their 
insistence on the immutable distinctiveness of colonial subjects, rendering their empires 
unsustainable and ushering in a world of nation states somewhere around 1960 (Cooper 2005, 
23, 170). In contrast to empires, this argument goes, nation states emphasize an imagined 
commonality among their citizens who are members of a single national community (Burbank 
and Cooper 2010, 8; Gellner 2008 [1983]). Although imperialism, referring to a wider 
asymmetrical projection of power beyond stipulated borders, continues to exist within nation-
states, Cooper—and others who have followed his influential definition, including Laura Stoler 
and Paul Kramer—have argued such imperialist phenomena should be distinguished from the 
noun empire (Kramer 2011, 1350; Cooper 2005, 30).  Cooper’s definition has since been taken 
up by scholars of Russian, US and Portuguese imperial formations (Morrison 2012b, 926; 
Alessio 2013, 77; Frenz 2013, 193).  
The stakes of a division between empire and nation-state has been particularly salient in 
the case of the People’s Republic of China. In the early twentieth century, scholars such as Liang 
Qichao were preoccupied with building a national consciousness to unite the “new people” of 
China from the ruins of a multiethnic Qing empire (Liang 1994; Schneider 2017). The twenty-
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first century finds some Chinese scholars defending the territorial expansions of the Qing and 
earlier dynasties into Xinjiang, Tibet, southern China and southeast Asia as forms of “nation-
building.” These more recent scholarly maneuvers respond to arguments by primarily North-
American-based scholars that the Ming and Qing dynasties established imperial forms of rule 
across both continental and maritime frontiers—“imperial” in the sense that those in power 
subjugated non-dominant groups by way of political and economic control, which often included 
the permanent settlement (i.e., colonization) of new populations within a territory  (Crossley 
2002; Di Cosmo 1998; Pomeranz 2005).1 On this definition, late imperial Chinese rule parallels 
an expansionist project very similar to that imposed by Europeans on societies throughout South 
and Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and the New World. 
The implications of this claim have not been lost on contemporary Han Chinese scholars. 
Amid the political turmoil that continues to mark Han and non-Han relations in the People’s 
Republic, acknowledging China as an imperial power appears to threaten the territorial integrity 
of the modern Chinese nation-state (Perdue 1998b, 255; Elliott 2015, 187).  Claiming that 
territories such as Tibet always-already belonged to “China” or that their populations were 
willingly and naturally attracted to superior Chinese ways of life, some PRC scholars have 
accordingly attacked American historical scholarship associated with the so-called “New Qing 
history” for revealing the violence which sustained late imperial state-making on the Chinese 
frontier (Li, 2015).  Their content and stridency echoes one of the earliest critiques of Qing 
revisionist history by the US-based scholar Ho Ping-t’i, who argued that assimilation to Chinese 
norms, not inner Asian institution-building, uniquely enabled the success of Manchu rule (Ho 
1998).  Yet even among scholars who acknowledge the violence inherent in Ming and Qing rule 
over heterogenous, non-Han populations, many—including historians of China based outside the 
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PRC, or writing before its founding in 1949—reject comparisons between late-imperial Chinese 
statecraft and European imperialism. They argue that there is a qualitative difference between 
aggressive capitalist expansion and pre-modern state building (e.g., Hsu 2015, 163).  
Such objections suggest that resistance to viewing past or present Chinese regimes as 
imperial powers is not entirely a political move, but also a historiographic one that points to 
different evidence for interpreting the past. Chinese discourse historically has had no single word 
or reification akin to “imperialism” in European languages. Its existing term for “empire” (diguo) 
more resembles the ambivalent early modern European usage that labelled the Ming and Qing 
dynasties ‘empires’ only in the sense that these were monarchical regimes with authority over 
vast territories (Fitzmaurice 2014, 17–18).2 When the terms for imperialism and colonialism 
entered the Chinese vocabulary in the early twentieth century (as diguo zhuyi and zhimin zhuyi 
respectively), they referred more specifically to the (often capital-driven) expansion undertaken 
by contemporary world powers in Europe and the US, and their Japanese aspirants (Karl 2002, 
63-4; Notelhelfer 1971, 82). Using a contemporary social science concept of empire to describe 
historical Ming or Qing dynastic territorial expansion seems, to many Sinophone historians 
culturally, temporally and even economically out of joint 
Rather than reject out of hand the alternative interpretations of these Chinese critics, or 
pursue the question of whether “empire” really existed in the Chinese past, in this essay we take 
a different route. We consider the insights that emerge when “empire” (and its cognates) is 
recognized as a global co-production: that is, a term whose meaning emerges from multiple 
intersecting histories and scholarly debates about those histories.3 Empire is not, in other words, 
a term arising within European history against which Qing, Ottoman, or other historical 
experience is applied and compared. Rather, it is a comparative concept that has been 
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transformed by and at the intersection of (inter alia) Qing dynastic expansion, the rise of Chinese 
national consciousness, European domestic and colonial expansion, and the discourses devised 
by multiple actors across time to narrate all of these.  Recognizing empire as a conceptual co-
production entails, for example, noting how Chinese critiques of the term themselves often turn 
on constructions of Han Chinese civilization perpetuated by the Manchu Qing, as they explained 
their activities in Tibet and elsewhere to Han Chinese audiences (Adler 2004, 109; Oidtmann 
2018, 16-19). But it also entails taking seriously the substance of those critiques, including how 
they interpret European and American pasts in relation to putatively Chinese ones. When Han 
Chinese thinkers confront such pasts—both their histories of territorial annexation, as well as the 
genealogy of concepts such as “imperialism” or “nation” used to describe the states that result—
they produce understandings of the past that are not reducible to their definitions at point of 
origin.   
Numerous insights flow from this specific examination of empire as a co-production, 
particularly in relation to the periodization that divides (past) empires from (modern, present-
day) nation-states. If scholars of the “New Qing History” use the term empire in part to forestall 
the anachronistic projection of the Chinese nation-state into the past, their Chinese critics reject 
the story of China’s imperfect transition from “empire” to “nation” first raised by Joseph 
Levenson more than half a century ago (Levenson 1958). Some of them point rather to a 
continuity between state unification through territorial expansion and the assimilative activities 
of nation-building—past and present, in both China and the West—thereby querying not only 
what imperialism is, but also when it is supposed to occur. This, we suggest, opens up both 
normative and historiographic possibilities which are foreclosed by proclamations of the end of 
empire, or the beginning of a “post-colonial” age.  At the very least, understanding “empire” as a 
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co-production challenges variants of global history writing which discuss world empires without 
defining what an empire is (such as Darwin, 2007), and entails a revision of prominent global 
definitions that clearly separate the unification processes of (nation-)states from the “distinction 
and hierarchy” internal to empires (Burbank and Cooper 2010; Suny and Kivelson 2017).  
Similarly, it would challenge analyses of imperialism beyond the confines of global history 
which (following Hobson and Lenin) define imperialism in relation to the specific capitalist 
expansion of the modern era (Hobson 1948, 46; Lenin 1970, 20). Insofar as such distinctions 
between empire and nation, or pre-capitalist and capitalist development, presume a particular 
kind of periodization—in which empires are presumed to become such only at a particular point 
in history—this co-produced concept thus brings a different kind of temporality into view: 
namely, territorial expansionism may be irreducible to historical, large-scale periodizations that 
enable the identification of “imperial” (or, by extension, post-imperial or post-colonial) epochs. 
Ultimately, we suggest, the concept of ‘empire’ does not identify particular time periods so much 
as enable normative critiques of the abuse of power. 
 
China as Imperial Power: The view of “New Qing History” 
Most of what we might identify as imperial phenomena in late imperial China were not 
understood by either their administrators or critics in terms of a single project. Rather, such 
activities were considered under rubrics such as “frontier governance” (bian zheng), “Chinese-
barbarian differentiation” (Hua yi zhi bian), or “opening up new land” (kai kuo xin di).  These 
activities constituted a process of what was often called “great unification” (da yitong), a concept 
which appeared in the Spring and Autumn Annals (c.5th century BCE) and which was explicitly 
co-opted by the first emperor of a unified China, Qin Shi Huang (Li 2003, 97). This concept 
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evoked the universal charisma of Chinese culture to justify the ever-greater inclusion of non-Han 
individuals and groups into the orbit of Chinese civilization. Many contemporary historians in 
China continue to express a preference for using such rubrics over terms such as “imperialism,” 
to avoid the anachronism of applying concepts to historical actors with their own theoretical 
understanding of their activities (Zhang and Ding 2016, 28).  
Before discussing such work in any detail, however, we will briefly outline two distinct 
models of late imperial Chinese expansion identified by both anglophone and sinophone 
historians (Xu 2016, 38). The first, particularly prevalent during the Ming and on the southern 
frontiers of the Qing, tended to focus on ensuring the conformity of subject populations to Han-
centric visions of civilization, thereby enlarging the sphere of “all under Heaven” (tianxia). That 
is, social progress and thus the success of a territorial annexation could be measured (using the 
unreflective and ethnocentric standards of Chinese civilization) by how moral and virtuous the 
subject populations became under guidance from the institutions established by the central 
imperial administration. This meant that indigenous populations in what were considered China’s 
“internal frontiers,” such as the Buyi people of Guizhou or the “raw” aborigines of Taiwan, were 
regarded as backward for not subscribing to Confucian norms (Teng 2006, 26; Weinstein 2014, 
125). At least among the educated scholar-officials who administered the empire, consuming and 
producing such forms of high culture (wen) among both Chinese and barbarians was seen as 
necessary and sufficient for endowment of a unified political identity flowing from participation 
in a unified civilizational continuity (Langlois 1980).  Imposition of such practices on a subject 
population, in Chinese and European colonial ideology, were underpinned by “the belief that the 
process of domination is one of helping the dominated to attain or at least approach the superior 
cultural, religious and moral qualities characteristic of the center itself” (Harrell 1995, 4). In 
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practice, of course, the success of the “conformity” model was typically indexed not through any 
measures of inherent virtue, but by how often central or local authorities had to intervene to quell 
rebellions or use force to collect taxes on cleared land (Cheng 2017).   
The second model of expansion, prevalent on the northern and western frontiers, was that 
of the patronage practiced by Qing emperors. This practice probably had its roots in the pre-
conquest Manchu alliance with the Mongols. In 1636, the second Qing Emperor, Hong Taiji, 
took the title Khan, suggesting patronage of Mongol as well as Manchu cultural symbols (Elliott 
2001, 63). After the conquest of Xinjiang and Tibet, the Qianlong emperor (1735-1796) also 
served as a cultural and religious figurehead in Tibetan and Uighur traditions. While Manchu 
forces drove territorial expansion in western China, with maps of these regions being labelled in 
Manchu rather than Chinese (Newby 2005, 252), expansion in Taiwan and southern China rested 
on Han Chinese settlers who brought with them the notions of cultural superiority outlined 
above.   
Since at least the 1990s, scholars have sought to demonstrate the ways in which Ming and 
(more commonly) Qing governance shared much in common with other contemporary empires. 
Peter Perdue was among the first to call for examining the Qing in light of a comparative history 
of imperialism, citing Qing needs to maintain a large military force for domestic oppression, 
ensure the loyalty of local elites, and balance bureaucratic uniformity with diverse local cultures 
as key elements of a shared, global concept of empire (Perdue 1998b, 256). His research 
dovetailed with renewed attention to Manchu-language scholarly material already underway, 
which revealed new sources and mechanisms for the foundations of Qing power (Bartlett 1985; 
Rawski 1996). 
These approaches coalesced into a research agenda often associated with the “New Qing 
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history,” which argues for a global view of the Qing not only or even primarily as a Chinese 
dynasty but as an inner Asian empire (Waley-Cohen 2004). Historians associated with this 
approach have demonstrated the Qing’s embeddedness in early modern global circulations of 
people, technologies, and institutions, as well as its indebtedness to inner Asian as much as 
Chinese ideologies of governance (e.g. Crossley 2012; Elliott 2001). Perdue among others has 
shown how the Qing paralleled its European counterparts in political and military structures, in 
part due to its persistent interaction with central Eurasian empires and European technology 
(Perdue 1998a).  By participating in a systematic gathering of information about peoples with 
whom they were coming into contact through exploration, colonization, and diplomacy, the Qing 
also engaged in a form of ethnography that Laura Hostetler has associated with contemporary 
“state-building” processes all over the world, from Tokugawa Japan to the Ottoman empire 
(Hostetler 2000). These processes strongly match attempts to extract knowledge, translate it into 
new terms and combine it in ways conducive to control of peripheral populations that was a 
significant mark of European imperial control of Egypt and the Middle East (Mitchell 2007).  
To scholars such as James Hevia, to ignore such obvious similarities between Chinese 
and European expansion would be to perpetuate “area studies exceptionalism…and notions of 
China’s uniqueness in the age of European global domination (i.e., China as semi-colony),” 
without fully exploring how and why these historical phenomena have interacted over time 
(Hevia 1993, 25). The New Qing history also challenges scholars of European empire by 
demonstrating alternative sites of imperial practice outside European circulations of power. They 
contribute to a broader scholarship that aims to theorize a wide variety of imperialisms in a 
comparative frame, while also recognizing the varied expressions of imperial sovereignty even 
within the confines of one empire. Some of these efforts began as early as the late nineteenth 
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century, when contemporary observers of the British empire saw in fact two empires: the empire 
of white settler colonies and the empire of dominion over non-white peoples (Lieven 2003, 21). 
Since the collapse of the British Empire in the 1940s and 1950s, an even wider variety of 
imperialisms have been articulated, beginning with Gallagher and Robinson’s suggestion that 
Britain expanded as much by “informal empire” as through formal colonies (Gallagher and 
Robinson 1953, 1) and continuing with Said’s more recent influential formulation of “cultural 
imperialism” (Said 1994). Noting the heterogeneity of historical experiences labelled 
“imperialism,” Emma Teng has argued that we should build on this already-existing diversity to 
extend the term to the Qing case, and in so doing “initiate dialogue and inquiry where before 
there were none” (Teng 2006, 10).  
Such analogic possibilities invite a further, normative argument for seeing Ming and 
Qing dynastic expansion as “colonial” or “imperial.” Applying the vocabulary of imperialism 
and colonialism to new contexts can be profoundly normatively empowering—that is, it provides 
a very specific kind of critical purchase on forms of power that would otherwise remain obscured 
or distorted. For example, naming the Qing presence on Taiwan as “colonial,” Teng argues, 
enables us to resist contemporary PRC claims to so-called “national reunification” on the basis of 
Taiwan’s inherent Chineseness. Without recourse to such vocabulary, she argues, it is more 
difficult to see how and where prior Chinese regimes employed coercion in order to force 
assimilation of heterogenous peoples into “China,” and impossible then to proceed with 
Taiwan’s “decolonization” from mainland China (Teng 2006, 250-251). Mark Elliott has 
similarly argued that resisting arguments for Chinese particularity by using such “global 
categories” would reveal that Chinese territorial expansion was a matter of “conquest and 
colonization” of non-Han groups, and not a project of “grand unification” as Chinese critics of 
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the New Qing History allege (Elliott 2015, 210-11).  
Yet, however valuable such scholarly tools may be for doing certain kinds of political 
work, they must always be used with caution. Historians who allege that Chinese expansionary 
activity was “imperial” typically assume that that the various means used by the Ming and Qing 
dynasties to expand dominion over territories and populations amounts to a form of imperialism 
(Oidtmann 2018, 42; Wang 2011, 3) . Unfortunately, few scholars ever define the term explicitly 
(e.g., Millward 1998, 17; Herman 2007; Fijeskö 2017, 6-10). James Millward himself notes that 
while the Qing exhibits the outward characteristics of most empires—namely “territorial 
vastness, strong centralized power, bureaucratic administration, universalist systems of 
legitimation, and inclusion of multiple culturally or politically distinct territories in an 
overarching political formation” (Millward 1998, 265 fn31)—he also argues that no single 
doctrine of imperialism could unify the diverse and distinctive experiences of Qing rule.  
 
Critical Reception and Overlapping Histories 
The historical narratives offered by the New Qing history typically contrast in revealing 
ways with how many modern Chinese historians have interpreted dynastic expansion. They often 
argue that Ming and Qing dynastic expansion is qualitatively different from European 
imperialism, because their relevant phenomena are separated in time. This challenge should be 
taken seriously because it highlights a fundamental choice for historians: the moment of 
periodization.  Frederic Jameson has called this moment an “absolute historiographic beginning, 
that cannot be justified by the nature of the historical material or evidence, since it organizes all 
such material and evidence in the first place” (Jameson 2002, 23). These decisions can and do 
vastly alter our reading of history. Historians of the Islamic world, for example, have complained 
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that assigning a “pre-history” to the rise of Islam in the Arab peninsula suggests an unchanging 
essence to the religion, tying it to one region and ignoring the significance of its global spread 
(Bashir 2014, 529). Debate among contemporary Chinese historians has likewise centered on the 
political and interpretive consequences of labelling certain kinds of historical experience as 
belonging to one era rather than another (e.g., Liu 2019, 774-5). To many Chinese critics, 
expansionist activities along Chinese continental and maritime frontiers do not appear either 
particularly distinct or particularly worthy of condemnation as “imperialist,” because the time of 
their occurrence does not necessarily coincide either with the emergence of modern nation-states 
in Europe or with the capitalist expansion of the modern era (Ge & Yin 2016, 10).  
Understanding such divisions of time in relation to imperialism requires first 
understanding the history of the terms diguo zhuyi (imperialism) and zhimin zhuyi (colonialism), 
as well as the history of Chinese conceptions of dynastic expansion and nation-building. This 
history reveals the extent to which the application of the term “empire” remains entangled with 
the pasts of both European and Japanese nation-states, including the empires upon which they 
were built.  Diguo zhuyi first emerged in Chinese discourse at the turn of the twentieth century in 
writing which was specifically concerned with imperialism as a novel malady on the global stage 
(Karl 2002, 63-64). The terms gained greater currency when Communist theorists emphasized 
the close connection between the expansion of European capitalist development and the 
subordinate global position into which China was thereby thrust (Wang 2012, 164). Writing in 
1926, Chen Duxiu, co-founder of the Chinese Communist Party, explicitly distinguished between 
the activities of expansionist Chinese states and “modern” European imperialism.  He argued that 
“invasion into other countries is surely a characteristic of imperialism, but the invasion by the 
ancient Roman Empire and the Chinese West[ern] Han dynasty for their territorial expansion can 
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only be labelled as feudal imperialism, which is totally different from today’s modern 
imperialism” (cited in Wang 2012, 172). 
Equally significant and related, however, is the fact that during this same period in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, European contemporaries such as J. A. Hobson and 
Lord Acton were commenting on the emerging conflation of national and imperial ambitions.  
The sociologist Krishnan Kumar identifies this period as the height of convergence between 
“nation” and “empire” as both ideals and practices. Critics such as Hobson noted how 
nationalism, underpinned and driven by capitalist expansion, threatened as much as imperialism 
to “overflow its natural banks and absorb the near or distant territory of reluctant and 
unassimilable peoples” (Hobson 1902, 6; cited in Kumar 2010, 132). It was also at this time that 
the processes of “conquest, colonization, and cultural change” taking place across Europe since 
the early middle ages—processes identified as key to “the making of Europe” and its nation-
states (Bartlett 1993)—were being written into national narratives of France, England and 
Prussia as processes of nation-building (Weber 1976; Bell 2007). In other words, at the very time 
these nations were deepening involvement in overseas colonies, they were also engaged in the 
parallel activity of swallowing up their own internal minorities—a process historians and social 
critics would later identify with “internal” colonialism (Hechter 1975; Byrd 2011). For our 
purposes, the most prominent example of this relationship between expansionary processes and 
national self-identity was the drive among competing European nations to secure trading rights 
in China, culminating in a scramble for concessions in the late 1890s (Bickers 2011). 
The point here is not to dismiss use of a term like “empire” out of hand solely on the 
basis of its own imperialist genealogy. Rather, we hope to point out that the intersecting histories 
of a term’s application contribute to its general valence, including its conceptual relationship to 
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other terms such as “nation.” This is true for European as much as Chinese usage of the term. In 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when European thinkers were noting the 
explicit pursuit of empire by nation-states in a global competition for domination and resources, 
they also noted the pursuit of nationalism using imperial means.  The nation “came to be 
associated with the power-status of the established national culture, and the imposition of its 
values on ethnic or cultural minorities both within and beyond the body politic was now 
considered essential” to national development (Mommsen 1990, 215; discussed in Kumar 2010, 
132). The paradigmatic referents for terms such as “nation” and “empire” in European history 
and contemporary politics were therefore mutually implicated rather than distinctly delineated 
when they entered Chinese discourse. As Ge Zhaoguang has observed in his own ruminations on 
the nature of empire, “the modern nation-state is a product of the traditionally centralized empire, 
preserving remnants of the ideology of empire, from which we can see the histories of both were 
intertwined” (Ge 2017, 23).  
At the very same time, many late Qing and Republican-era scholars were using a different 
set of inherited terms to discuss activities, discourses and attitudes identified as “imperial” by 
such scholars as Teng, Elliott and Millward—even as they were in the process of producing a 
new language for national self-identity in conversation with both European and Japanese 
experience. These terms drew from long standing traditions within Chinese thought initially 
deployed in competing narratives of the modern Chinese nation in the period before the collapse 
of the Qing in 1911. Initially, anti-Manchu Han nationalist revolutionaries demanded a purge of 
non-Chinese elements within the new state, but eventually there emerged convergence on 
preserving the Qing as a territorial, albeit not political, model for unifying the nation’s borders 
(Schneider 2017, 51). Retaining the borders of the Qing’s multi-ethnic empire protected access 
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to natural resources and provided bulwarks against foreign assault along China’s northern and 
western sides, but it also entailed writing a new kind of history that could justify including these 
predominantly non-Han territories as always-already a part of “China” (Duara 1995, 33-41).  
Following Liang Qichao’s influential example in his 1902 tract “Preface to Chinese history,” in 
which he explicitly reduced two thousand years of “Asian” history into a version of “Chinese 
history,” Chinese historiography began focusing on how the charismatic influence of Chinese 
civilization attracted ever more non-Han peoples within its orbit (Liang 1994, 2). These visions 
drew on longstanding beliefs in the inherent “assimilative power” (tonghua li) of an 
autochthonous Chinese culture to spontaneously induce the “sinicization” (Hanhua) of non-
Chinese groups and individuals (Schneider 2017, 4). Such assumptions played a major role in 
Sun Yat-sen’s influential formulation of the principle of minzu (nationality), in which he 
predicted the eventual absorption of “weak and small peoples” into the dominant Han majority 
(Leibold 2004).  
Claims like Sun’s have persisted throughout the Maoist period and well into the post-1978 
reform era (Farquhar 1968, 188; Schneider 2001, 136). They exhibit obvious features of 
“imperial” rule, insofar as they justify cultural violence to non-Han populations in the name of a 
superior civilization destined to absorb them. But there have also been counter-discourses within 
Chinese scholarship that explored alternatives to Sun’s and Liang’s vision of a racially and 
culturally homogenous community (Leibold 2006). These efforts, most prominently mobilized in 
the 1930s to counter imperial Japanese territorial claims over vast reaches of East Asia, sought to 
resolve the problem of Han domination of a multi-ethnic state by challenging the idea of a 
unified or homogenous Zhonghua minzu (the “Chinese nation”) (Jenco 2019). Their project of 
“historical geography” (lishi dilixue) was both subversively anti-traditional and self-consciously 
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modern; they drew particular attention to the violence that attended the historical assimilation of 
minority peoples, and to the contingency of the labels used to distinguish “Chinese” from 
“barbarian” or other ethnic groups (e.g., Tong 1934, Gu 2010). Yet its main adherents tended to 
sustain their critique without recourse to the concept of “imperialism,” and explicitly identified 
their work in terms of a continuity with the “frontier studies” (bianjiang xue) undertaken by 
statecraft (jingshi) scholars of the mid- to late-Qing, such as Wei Yuan and Gong Zizhen (Sun 
and Wang 2013, 3).  
Such interest in alternative concepts to empire in the 1930s shows that it was not only as 
a consequence of European, capital-driven colonial incursion that “imperialism” took on its 
particular valence for Chinese audiences, but also due to the activities of scholars and 
policymakers working for the Japanese empire. In fact, the first mention in Chinese of the Qing 
as an “empire” was in the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki, which admitted Qing defeat and ceded 
Taiwan and the southern Liaodong peninsula to Japan. Mark Elliott suggests that this attribution 
was likely an attempt by negotiator Li Hongzhang to make China appear more equal to Japan, a 
move which subsequently facilitated later identification of the Qing as an “empire” among 
Chinese intellectuals such as Zhang Bingling (Ou 2014, 37–38). In the same article, Elliott 
ascribes later Chinese reluctance to apply the term “empire” to the Qing as related to China’s 
coincident self-identity as a nation-state (Ou 2014, 31). But the discussion here brings other 
possibilities into view, particularly given the overlapping histories of “nation” and “empire” as 
these concepts took on new life in Chinese terms.  The reluctance to use the term empire may be 
equally related to the fact that the Qing found its identity as such  in a humiliating situation of 
defeat, not only in a context of European colonial domination but also more proximately at the 
hands of an imperial power that decades later would formally annex Chinese territory. These 
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contexts continue to exert direct influence on this debate.  Japanese imperial interests directly 
motivated research on Manchukuo, including—as Chinese critics have pointed out—the 
collection of Manchu-language materials by Japanese scholars, which subsequently formed the 
key sources for the New Qing history (Li 2016, 16; Xu 2016, 8).4  In what follows we examine 
current Chinese responses to the New Qing history by taking account of how these overlapping 
contexts have resulted in a multivalence for the term “empire.”  
 
Imperialism and its Others: Responses to the New Qing History 
Recent resistance to using “imperialism” to describe the Chinese past continues to center 
on the issue of Han domination of a multi-ethnic state.  It is therefore unsurprising that some of 
this scholarship is inherently political and ahistorical—such as Ma Dazheng’s assertion that 
“China has been a multi-ethnic unified country for more than 2000 years,” or Zhao Tingyang’s 
insistence that the Zhou dynastic concept of governing for “all under Heaven” was capable of 
uniting diverse cultures to create “long-term peace which lasted for centuries in China” (Ma and 
Shan 2012, 67; Zhao 2009, 9). However,  more historically-minded scholarship has 
acknowledged the violence inherent in Chinese expansion, and the contingency of the modern 
borders of the PRC which depended on this process. Yet these scholars insist that these processes 
are qualitatively, and in some cases temporally, distinct from European imperialism.  Here we 
will consider two variants on this challenge, articulated by some of the most influential thinkers 
in this field and often in dialogue with one another.  The first variant questions the difference 
between the violence inherent in state building and that deployed in imperial expansion, while 
the second draws a distinction between Chinese colonial expansion and “modern” western 
imperialism. 
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The first is the distinction is proposed by Wang Rongzu, a historian at Taiwan’s National 
Central University.  Operating outside the People’s Republic, Wang is not subject to the growing 
political sensitivity there surrounding the conceptualization of the history of China’s western 
regions.  Nevertheless, he notes that one of his motivations for rejecting new Qing historians’ 
labelling of China as an empire is that this is not a new theory, but a continuation of the Japanese 
imperialist theories of the 1930s which served to justify their presence in China as liberators of 
Manchus, helping them to establish a separate Japanese puppet state (Wang 2016, 337).   Against 
this background, Wang raises an important challenge. Firstly, he points out that many modern 
states are multi-ethnic. That the Qing ruled over diverse ethnicities did not make them an empire, 
as Cooper’s definition would suggest, but rather makes them similar to modern multi-ethnic 
states, such as the US, Russia and even Japan, where ethnicity and nationality are generally 
distinguished from each other. He suggests that within this history there was a process of 
“sinicisation” (hanhua) in which groups were culturally assimilated into the mainstream, but he 
does not attribute any unique power to this process. Instead, he likens it to the modern 
assimilative process of westernisation (xihua) (Wang 2016, 328-9).   
Not only is China not unique in being a multi-ethnic state, but Wang also points out that 
it is far from unique in being a product of violent state-making. Nevertheless, he rejects the 
assertion that this violence was imperial.  For example, he suggests that the Kangxi emperor’s 
military campaign against the Zunghar leader Galdan was a territorial expansion driven by the 
need to secure the state’s borders, something clearly distinct from imperial expansion: 
 
This kind of policy arrangement and…so called “modern imperialism,” which aims to 
extract resources, take advantage of cheap labor and expand market opportunities, is 
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certainly not the same, therefore we have to clarify the concept of colonization 
(zhimin).… Expansion which arises out of a purely defensive motive, whether or not it 
ought to be declared positive, has far more legitimacy than expansion which arises from 
an economic motive (Wang 2016, 333).   
 
For Wang, the distinction between European extractive imperialism and Qing state 
building does not render China exceptional because “no matter whether ancient or modern, in 
China or outside, to unify almost necessarily requires annexing territory to be realized” (Wang 
2016, 334).  Wang explicitly rejects taking the contemporary borders of the People’s Republic as 
a given historical telos, and acknowledges that Xinjiang and Tibet’s incorporation into China 
were both violent processes and products of historical contingency (Wang 2016, 333).  Yet, the 
difference in motive, he argues, renders “colonialism” an inappropriate label.   
The second challenge admits that Chinese expansion could be violent and colonial—with 
some critics even rejecting Wang’s idea the idea the Kangxi emperor’s motives were purely 
defensive (Yao 2016b, 310)—but insists on qualitative differences between European and 
Chinese imperial practices. Ge Zhaoguang, of Shanghai’s Fudan University, offers an influential 
and representative view. For example, regarding the gaitu guiliu policies in southwest China 
(which replaced indigenous headmen with Qing officials), he argues that ‘we absolutely cannot 
doubt that this kind of civilizing (wenming hua) process was the same as a colonizing (zhimin 
hua) process and was not only the spreading of prosperity but was filled with blood and fire’ (Ge 
2016, 7).   For Ge, the violence inherent in Chinese expansion and integration of different 
peoples renders it colonial (or imperial—two terms he seems to use interchangeably).  
His position is striking, given that he, like other scholars in the PRC, is operating within a 
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political context in which discussion of policy in China’s historical borderlands is increasingly 
restricted. Ge himself also remains involved in state activities including serving as a member of 
the National Textbook Committee. At the same time, however, Ge insists that these civilizing 
processes were distinct from nineteenth-century European expansion: 
 
When comparing the Ming and Qing gaitu guiliu process with the colonial advance of 
England, France, Spain, Portugal and Holland, it is important to look at three differences. 
Firstly, there is the distinction between going overseas to conquer and gradually 
expanding from the centre to the borderlands.  Secondly, the purpose of one is to plunder 
resources, while that of the other is integrating [naru] territory into the empire.  Thirdly, 
one maintains the differences between metropole and colony, while the other, through a 
gradual process of sinicization, assimilates foreign groups (Ge 2016, 8).  
 
Unlike Wang, Ge accepts the label colonial for Chinese practices, but implies this is inherent to 
state-making and is qualitatively different from nineteenth-century European imperialism.  Ge 
adopts Byung Ho Lee’s assertion that China was a “patrimonial imperial state”: unlike a nation-
state it was not formed through one ethnicity asserting self-determination, and unlike an empire 
it did not rule through insisting on the maintenance of ethnic difference (Ge 2016, 8; Lee 2011, 
7).  Instead, different ethnic groups were assimilated to form one new national identity. 
One distinctive way in which that assimilation took place in China, Ge argues, is through 
those very gaitu guiliu policies, which enforced Han social customs and practices on minority 
peoples of the southwest. Ge argues that such policies aimed to make these peoples “imaginable” 
[xiangxiang] but one could equally say “legible,” to the Chinese state (Ge 2016, 5). Despite these 
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claims to Chinese exceptionalism, Ge’s argument and language converge with accounts that 
emphasize the violence of state building in both empires and nations. The social scientist James 
Scott has argued that states aim to make the societies they govern more legible through 
simplifications and homogenization to control them. These strategies are as visible in the 
building of colonial states, such as in the Spanish Philippines, as they are in nineteenth century 
France (Scott 1998, 70-78).  For Scott, it is a myth that any nation is formed of one 
unconstructed ethnicity; rather, he argues, nation-states are reliant on a process of 
homogenization similar to that which Ge describes in southwest China.  
This insistence on a qualitative distinction between Chinese and European imperialism is 
also taken up by Yao Dali, a colleague of Ge’s at Fudan.  Yao suggests that at the root of the 
disputed meaning between European and Chinese thinkers is how we periodize imperialism.  
Chinese thinkers, he argues, regard imperialism as a type of invasive policy in which strong 
capitalist countries “oppress, enslave and exploit backwards countries,” whereas Western 
thinkers link the word “colonia” to its Roman roots and therefore see imperialism as a 
transhistorical process of “discovery, opening up and developing” (Yao 2016b, 305).  Yao 
concludes that  
 
Colonial behavior is the norm among all peoples and within all stages of societal 
development … [but] capitalist resource extraction developed at almost the same time as 
modern colonialism [xiandai zhiminzhuyi] and was especially repulsive and unacceptable, 
increasingly giving rise to a new intellectual tide [of nationalism] (Yao 2016b, 308).  
 
As a result, Yao argues that while the label colonial is applicable to Chinese state 
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building activities, it is qualitatively different from modern imperialism.  For Yao, “modern 
imperialism”, that is, the reification “imperialism” rather than the activities of early modern 
empires, emerged around 1825.  From this point on, “the principle driver of [western expansion] 
was the contest over profit, markets, raw materials and the export of capital” (Yao 2016a, 355). 
Modern imperialism is distinctive, and modern, because of its imbrication with the emergence of 
capitalism. 
As a mainland Chinese scholar, potentially subject to the political pressures created by 
the PRC’s increasingly coercive policies in Xinjiang, Yao does not deny that colonialism exists 
in China. In fact he emphasizes that if 19th and 20th century colonialism was more ‘colonial’ it 
was not because it was more violent or coercive, but rather because it maintained a sharp divide 
between the metropole and colonies (Ho 1998, ;Yao 2016b, 307).  It was this divide which gave 
rise to nationalist sentiment.  
Yao’s point is that imperialism cannot be viewed as a transhistorical phenomenon; 
different kinds of colonialism exist in different historical phases, and imperialism is distinctively 
modern.  He echoes Peter Perdue, who has pointed out that productive comparisons across 
empires do not try to erect models which are divorced from historical time (Perdue 1998b, 259). 
Thus, it is not just what imperialism is that renders Qing activities distinct from those of 
European empires, but also when it is.  In his two recently published general histories of China, 
for example, the US-based historian Hsu Cho-yun has argued that China only joined Europe on 
the path towards the development of a nation state when it was faced with the threat of foreign 
imperialism. Prior to this, the Chinese cultural sphere was linked not by empire but by the 
cultural unity he labels tianxia, “all under Heaven,” closely intertwined with the state (Hsu 2015, 
13; Hsu 2012, 179). For some historians, the difference seems to lie more in how the past is 
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periodized than in what specifically it contains: empires, and the violent processes of imperialism 
that presumably accompany them, are differentiated from the (arguably equally violent) 
processes of nation-state building which succeed them solely by how they are organized in time. 
In contesting application of the term “imperialism” to specific points of the Chinese past, 
Chinese critics effectively draw attention precisely to this conceptual weakness in attempts to 
compare empires.   
It seems, then, that if we want to make comparative claims about imperialism we need to 
explain both if and how imperialism is distinct from state-building, and why imperialism in its 
modern, capitalist form is not fundamentally distinct from its early modern variant.  By 
answering these challenges, we may arrive at new insights as to what imperialism is and, 
potentially, also what it might mean to advance “post-colonial” or “post-imperial” criticism.   
 
Empire as a conceptual co-production 
We contend that assertions by Chinese critics that European imperialism and Qing state 
building are fundamentally distinct should not be dismissed simply as an instance of Chinese 
exceptionalism.  Rather, they reflect a long history of Chinese engagement with the concept of 
“empire,” which extends beyond the borders and history of the contemporary PRC and in some 
ways does not always serve its interests. If terms such as “imperialism” are going to work on a 
global scale that does not reduce all historical phenomena to European categories, we must 
acknowledge that the meaning of empire can be extrapolated only through examination of the 
similarities and differences in interpretations of it across cultural contexts. The lack of agreement 
among historians of China about when imperialism was and was not present encourages us to 
expand the global temporal scope of the term, and to reconsider the time of empires as well as of 
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imperialism. In doing so, we are confronted with the insight that “imperialism” is not a 
descriptive so much as a normative concept: it names and condemns a particular expression of 
power, rather than specifies historical processes that endure over time.  
Wang Rongzu’s equation of US multiculturalism with the Chinese management of ethnic 
diversity, for example, highlights the difficulty of periodizing empires as state formations, 
because it suggests a continuity that challenges Cooper’s chronology and typology.  How far, we 
might ask, did the “world of nation-states” really spell the end of empires?  Cooper has argued, 
influentially, that “in one way or another, [empires] had to articulate difference with 
incorporation. Difference had to be grounded in institutions and discourses” (Cooper 2005, 23). 
Yet this argument leaves space to question how distinct from contemporary nation states 
“empires” really are. On this view perhaps the US and China are still empires rather than nations. 
After all, China maintains an “ethnic minority status” policy which, nominally at least, claims to 
respect the diversity of different constituencies who occupy discrete territory in order to justify 
their inclusion in the polity.  Similarly, the US federal government grants specific legal 
privileges, including limited scope for self-determination, to Native American populations living 
on reservation lands, while continuing to curtail recognition of their full autonomy as a means of 
ensuring national unity (Duthu 2009; Richardson, 2009).   
The assertion that imperial behavior transcends historical epochs and is present in all 
state building processes is not a new observation; in fact, it resonates with recent scholarship that 
notes the difficulty of applying the binary of nation and empire to real state formations. 
Historians describe the Soviet Union, for instance, as a state with “both imperial and national 
characteristics,” exercising sovereign rule organized by hierarchized differences more in the 
form of an empire than a typical nation-state (Kivelson and Suny 2017, 4–5). Justin Jacobs has 
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also deemed the Chinese state a “national empire,” in which “territorial and human 
heterogeneity”—which he takes to be the hallmarks of empire—have now become “nationalized 
to conform to new narratives of post-revolutionary political legitimacy” (Jacobs 2016, 234).  
Oddly, however, even historians who emphasize how much contemporary nations resemble 
empires cleave to the view that “empire is fundamentally different from what eventually 
emerged as the ideal type of the nation-state” (Kivelson and Suny 2017, 3; Kumar 2010, 121, 
137). One result of this commitment is that scholars routinely project into Chinese (and other) 
pasts a vision of empire as a state comprised of differentiated, multi-ethnic populations, without 
noting that this definition would not have been legible even to contemporary Europeans—who 
until the nineteenth century tended to associate empire more with the projection of sovereignty 
over space, than with rule over differentiated, subjugated populations (Pagden 1995, 12–13, 14).  
This anachronism has consequences for Chinese as well as European history. In the Chinese 
case, it informs historical narratives about the transformation of China from a universal 
normative civilization to merely one nation-state among others—which Joseph Levenson and 
John Fairbank famously identified as a movement from the unity of tianxia (“all-under-Heaven”) 
to the particularity of guo (a particular “state” or “nation”) (Levenson 1952; 1958; Fairbank 
1978). By posing a dichotomy between an empire’s unification of difference and the 
homogenizing, levelling processes of the nation-state, moreover, such narratives enforce amnesia 
about the ongoing “internal” imperial projects pursued by contemporary European and American 
powers in the name of promoting the dominance of their own nation (Byrd 2011, 38–43). 
One response to the challenge that imperialism is present in all state building might be to 
suggest, as Justin Mueller has claimed, sovereign rule itself is always-already imperial (Mueller 
2016, 434). State-making requires the neutralization of domestic rivals and the indoctrination of 
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its citizenry in processes which may themselves be seen as a form of imperialism. Vladimir 
Lenin, among others, gave voice to such insights when he argued that the unevenness of 
development in countries such as Russia and the US was parallel to the kinds of global inequality 
that consumed the surplus products of capitalism (Ėtkind 2011, 20-21).  Terms such as “internal 
imperialism” have thus been deployed as a means of drawing attention to the violence and 
oppression which marked the experience of marginalized populations even within a shared state 
(Gutiérrez 2004). What is perhaps most remarkable about the critical dissensus surrounding 
discussions of imperialism is precisely that dissenters tend to view this continuity between what 
we might identify as internal “socialization” processes and external “integration” processes as a 
reason to reject the term “imperialism,” rather than adopt it. But this leads us to ask: What are 
the consequences of this choice, and what kinds of insights does it make possible? 
In so far as there may be continuity between internal and external processes of 
oppressive rule, imperialist processes appear to have a temporality out of step with typical 
historicizations that see imperial expansion as an epoch: that is, as a “stage” on the way to 
nationhood or decolonial emancipation for many post-colonial states; as part of a history that 
modern liberal democracies must mark and overcome through reparations for past social 
inequalities, such as in regard to aboriginal claims in Australia and North America; or even (as in 
the early modern period) a natural next step for the grandizza associated with the attractiveness 
and might of domestic republican liberty (Armitage 2006; Ivison 2002; Duara 2004). Part of the 
trouble critics have in applying “imperialism” to parts of the past now claimed by the PRC may 
arise, then, not from a misunderstanding, but an insight, about the temporality of such imperialist 
processes. In their persistence, continuity, and reproduction, such processes do not happen once 
and for all in history, or even recur under particular conditions to mark epochs of expansion. 
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Rather, they persistently repeat themselves over and over within the micro-spans of individual 
lifetimes and family generations.  
If “imperial” processes recur ceaselessly on a micro-level in conventions that shape 
individual socialization, and on a macro-level in institutions that culminate in state-making— 
both within and outside designated domestic or state contexts—then it seems any hope for 
postcolonial emancipation would necessarily have to lie in a cultural critique: to move beyond 
imperialism would be to advance criticism of the very socialization processes that replicate 
themselves at different scales and on different levels over time, rather than of any particular 
political or economic project associated with territorial expansion in a given epoch. The 
temporality of empire’s overcoming is thus not (only) historical, then, but personal and 
generational. One such possibility is sketched by Iris Young, who identifies cultural 
imperialism—the marking out of certain social groups as both invisible and “other” to a more 
privileged dominant group—as one of the “five faces of oppression” in modern society (Young 
1990, 58-59). The solution to cultural imperialism, Young argues, lies in cultivating positive 
subjectivity among members of marginalized social groups, and resisting the imposition of a 
dominant culture’s way of life on one’s own. 
If this is true, then New Qing historians—and all scholars interested in how and why 
Chinese identity becomes transposed onto specific territorial space—might need to more 
carefully pry apart normative from empirical arguments, as a means of specifying the distinct 
premises underlying each. PRC claims to contested territories such as Taiwan and Tibet are 
problematic not because they are based on a factually erroneous continuity between what was a 
multi-ethnic empire and what now should be an ethnically homogenous nation-state; after all, 
similar arguments could be, and have recently been, put to the existing governments of Spain, 
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Great Britain, and other European powers (e.g., Declaració Dels Representants de Catalunya 
2017). Rather, such claims are reprehensible because they are sustained by violence that lacks a 
moral defense. What is really at stake is not whether or not a particular state formation is 
imperial, or what the definition of empire might be, but rather how violence of all kinds is used 
to promote or naturalize inequality in the service of rule.  
 
Conclusion 
Rather than ask if imperialism is or is not present in Chinese history, we have tried to 
demonstrate the ways in which viewing empire, nation and related terms as co-productions—
terms whose meaning emerges irreducibly from the intersection of multiple overlapping histories 
and discourses—can throw light on how connections between state-making, assimilation, and 
territorial expansion are historically narrated. European nation-state-making, implicated in 
violent processes of homogenization and systematization, has been distinguished from 
imperialism for the same reasons that some critical Chinese historians separate European 
capitalist imperialism from pre-modern Chinese expansion: both processes are seen as out of 
imperial time.  
The co-production of empire has revealed that its application may turn less on the 
evidence of “objective” historical comparison and more on the kind of critical work the label 
“imperialism” can do. In other words, the greatest value of the term “imperialism” may lie in its 
normative thrust—that is, it invites a particular form of value-judgment about the nature of 
violence, including when in time that violence and its distinctive forms of oppression are 
supposed to happen or be overcome. On this view, labels such as “empire” and “imperialism” 
name and condemn a particular expression of power, rather than delineate real historical entities 
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that endure in unambiguous ways over time and space. This insight could be applied as easily to 
Yao’s assertion that modern imperialism was qualitatively worse than previous expansions, as to 
Teng’s claims that Chinese activities on Taiwan were colonial. Both use the term to make a 
normative argument about where (and when) power has been inappropriately extended. 
At the same time, once we highlight the continuity between empires and nations, it 
becomes meaningful to ask how and why all states within the global system now choose to call 
themselves nations, regardless of whether or not they had inherited the territory—and some of 
the practices—of a pre-existing empire. Abandoning the clear-cut distinction between empires 
and nation states allows us to highlight continuities between the age of empires and the post-
colonial world, opening up new areas of historical enquiry as we reconsider both the novelty and 
the uniqueness of the nation as a state formation. Such enquiries throw further light on how, in 
Tim Brook’s words, “conquest is historically embedded in nation formation in Asia,” by 
expanding our scope to incorporate indigenous terms of art that operated in conceptual 
frameworks that sometimes link to empire, and sometimes do not (Brook 2016, 966, 968).  
Viewing these frameworks as co-produced, moreover, decenters historically dominant cultures 
(whether or Chinese or Western) as exclusive sites of conceptual innovation. Brook, for example, 
shows how the imagined unity behind both Ming and Qing expansion was based on the hybrid 
Mongol concept of a “great state,” drawn from multiple Chinese and Mongol precedents (Brook 
2016, 961).  
It may be argued that such a wide application of imperialism makes it amorphous, but 
arguably the term has always taken on diverse forms which do not make it reducible to specific 
phenomena. It also allows us to question the assertion that a world solely comprised of nation 
states has come into being. Rather than assume we already know what imperialism is, we should 
 30 
perhaps focus more explicitly on identifying and critiquing specific forms of violence—
rendering us better able to address those forms of violence, wherever and whenever they occur. 
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1 Manchu, Mongol and Tibetan studies have long been established in continental European and Russian academic 
circles (e.g. Stary 2013); however, this scholarship has generally not been targeted by Chinese critics of the New 
Qing History. I am indebted to Joachim Kurtz for discussions on this point. 
2 The definitive historical dictionary the Hanyu da cidian offers the first definition of diguo simply as “a state ruled 
by an emperor, with a monarchical system of government.”  
3 Here we follow Sheila Jasanoff’s influential definition of “co-production” as an “idiom” for interpreting complex 
social phenomena in ways that account for the interaction of knowledge and empirical experience (2004, 3). But we 
extend its meaning, to also include the conceptual innovations that emerge at the intersection of differently-situated 
cultural and political contexts. 
4 The study of Manchu and Manchukuo also gained ground among certain German and Italian scholars in the 1930s, 
whose fascist governments supported Japanese imperial ambitions in China.  
 
